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T his paper argues, first, that, before nudging is further embraced, it is necessary to think much more clearly 
about the concept of nudge and to 
distinguish between the different 
degrees of nudge that can be applied 
to targets. Second, that different 
degrees of nudge can present distinct 
issues of effectiveness, representation 
and ethics. Third, that a number of 
important issues are easily overlooked 
if nudge is seen as just another tool of 
state control.
‘Nudging’ involves structuring the 
choices that people make so as 
to lead them towards particular 
outcomes. Placing fruit next to the 
supermarket till, for example, gives 
a nudge towards healthy eating. 
Such ‘behaviour change’ strategies 
have become hugely popular with 
administrations on both sides of 
the Atlantic. (The site of the UK 
Behavioural Insights Team is at: http://
www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk)
THE RISE OF NUDGE
‘Nudge’ is associated with Thaler and 
Sunstein’s 2008 book of that title. 
The two authors see ‘nudge’ as: ‘… 
any aspect of the choice architecture 
that alters people’s behaviour in a 
predictable way without forbidding 
any options or significantly changing 
their economic incentives’. To count 
as a nudge, the intervention must 
be ‘easy and cheap to avoid’. In this 
conception the ‘choice architecture’ 
is the environment that frames an 
individual’s choice. Thus, it is said 
that putting the fruit at eye level 
counts as a nudge but banning junk 
food does not.
Nudge builds on the insights of 
cognitive psychology and behavioural 
economics. Individuals are seen 
as constrained by limitations of 
information, cognitive capacity and 
self-control and as tending to make 
poor decisions that do not serve their 
welfare. Nudges shift such decisions 
and build on a philosophy entitled 
‘libertarian paternalism’. Thus, nudge 
is said to possess a paternalistic 
dimension in stimulating choices that 
are seen as welfare enhancing. At the 
same time it is said to be liberal as it 
leaves the target person or firm free 
to choose to take the non-sensible 
course of action. 
Thaler and Sunstein give examples 
of at least seven nudge tools. These 
include defaults (opt-out rules) and 
design approaches – as where the 
main office doors lead directly to 
the stairs not the lifts. Information 
supplies and reminders can also serve 
to foster healthy decisions.
THREE DEGREES OF NUDGE
Three ‘degrees of nudge’ can be 
distinguished. ‘First Degree nudges’, 
such as simple warnings or reminders 
re s p e c t  t h e  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g 
autonomy of the individual and 
enhance reflective decision-making. 
( ‘There are three weeks left to 
complete the tax return.’). A ‘Second 
Degree nudge’ is  more ser ious 
and typically builds on behavioural 
limitations so as to bias a decision in 
the desired direction. Thus, a default 
rule with an opt-out can be used to 
shape decisions (e.g. in presumed 
consent to organ donation), as may 
designs of the physical environment 
(e.g. where the office smoking zone 
is placed at a distance from the work 
area). Both of these examples nudge 
individuals’ decisions by relying on 
human inertia.
The Second Degree nudge involves 
a greater impact on indiv idual 
autonomy than the First Degree 
nudge since the target’s ‘automatic’ 
responses will in practice lead him or 
her to accept the nudge with limited 
awareness - though the target of 
the nudge would be capable, on 
reflection, of realising that a nudge 
has been administered.
A ‘Third Degree nudge’ offers a yet 
more serious intrusion on autonomy 
because it involves behavioural 
manipulation to an extent that other 
nudges do not. Thus, a cigarette 
pack might show a graphic display of 
a corpse. The ‘manipulation’ stems, 
in the cigarette example, from the 
use of a message with an emotional 
power that blocks the consideration 
of all options and threatens the 
agent’s ability to act in accordance 
with her or his own preferences (as 
opposed to someone else’s). 
The difference between a Second 
and a Third Degree nudge is that, 
with the former, the message receiver 
has the practical potential to uncover 
the nudge, and assess its extent, by 
the exercise of reflection whereas, in 
the latter, this is to a greater extent 
blocked. 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
NUDGES
A limitation of the nudge is that a 
focus on individual choices may fail 
to address the causes of, or fail to 
provide the solution to, a number 
of problems. Obesity, for example, 
may be seen by nudge advocates 
to be the result of an accumulation 
of poor individual decisions (which 
can be improved by nudges) but this 
vision fails to take on board a host of 
biological, social and cultural causes 
of obesity. Nudges that are aimed at 
individuals, moreover, will not always 
prove effective when the undesirable 
behaviour at issue is the product of 
collective processes and policies (for 
example in a corporation).
A second limitation is that individuals’ 
responses to nudges wil l  differ 
across divergent institutional, social, 
Nudging is hugely popular with governments but it is a practice 
that raises both conceptual and controversial issues. Three 
degrees of nudge can be distinguished and these raise different 
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When contemplating nudging, moreover, it is essential to be 
clear and open about the philosophical basis for such action 
and to be aware that clashes between different modes of 
intervention may threaten not only effectiveness but also the 
serving of representative and ethical ends. 
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economic and cultural contexts. A 
nudge to encourage recycling may 
not work as well in a disadvantaged 
community as in an affluent district. 
Even a First Degree nudge, such 
as simple information supply, may 
prove effective only with a small 
minority of targets. Nudges that 
are genuinely paternalistic (Second 
and Third Degree nudges) may, 
moreover, undermine trust. Thus, 
in the field of medicine it has been 
warned that nudges can be seen as 
scare tactics by patients and that this 
can alienate them from medical staff 
and prejudice treatment.
It has also been pointed out that 
consumers may react perversely to 
nudges and ‘counter-nudging’ may 
also occur. The latter is exemplified 
when a retailer is instructed to limit 
displays of alcohol but counters with 
an advertising promotion.
REPRESENTATIONAL AND 
ETHICAL ISSUES
Objectors to nudge argue that the 
device lacks the transparency and 
public deliberation that are normally 
associated with command regimes. 
If a government issues a law that 
prohibits citizens from smoking 
in public places, representative 
processes will have been followed. 
If nudging is used, the process 
may be far more secretive—the 
nudge, for instance, may f low 
from an administrator’s decision on 
the design of a public building: a 
decision not subjected to advanced 
disclosure or accessible debate.
Second and Third Degree nudges, it 
is also said, do not involve seeking 
to identify the conception of welfare 
that the target would espouse. 
Rather, the nudger acts in a semi-
covert or covert manner to further 
the nudger’s own conception of the 
target’s welfare – which may involve 
re-shaping the target’s idea of their 
own welfare. Nudge proponents 
treat welfare as uncontroversial but 
it has been pointed out that many 
may agree in the abstract that better 
health is preferable to worse health, 
but if there is a choice between, 
say, enjoying life-shortening but 
intensely pleasurable vices during 
one’s college days versus abstaining 
during college to gain a couple of 
extra boring years at an advanced 
age, then better health may not look 
as unquestionably good.
Thaler and Sunstein emphasise 
that a nudge should be ‘easy and 
cheap to avoid’ but the nudge 
has power in so far as it impacts 
on the decision-maker of limited 
cognitive capacity, information and 
self-control. Those very limitations 
arguably mean that the target is 
unlikely to be well-placed to exercise 
the opt-out in cases of Second and 
Third Degree nudges. With Third 
Degree nudges, the posit ion is 
especially poor because the target 
will be ‘blocked’ to a greater extent 
from resorting to the opt-out.
Cumulations of nudges (of the 
Second and Third Degree) may 
also be an issue. They produce an 
aggregate burden and the worry 
is that the individual f ights an 
unending battle to construct his 
or her own preferences and to 
opt-out in order to further those 
preferences.
An issue of fairness also arises with 
Second and Third Degree nudges 
– they impose costs on sensible 
persons in order to enhance the 
welfare of  others  who behave 
irresponsibly. Thus, a law requiring 
all retail outlets to place alcohol in 
locked cabinets (for sale on express 
request) would inconvenience the 90 
or so per cent of the population who 
are able to limit their consumption 
to below ‘harmful’ levels.
Another defence of nudge argues 
that there is always a nudge from 
some direction. There is, though, 
an argument that to respond to 
nudges with state-applied counter 
nudges of the Second and Third 
Degree is exactly the wrong policy 
in those cases where proliferations 
of nudges produce citizens with 
‘choice structuring fatigue’ and they 
positively discourage the kinds of 
learning, responsible and thinking 
behaviour that most governments 
espouse. Many citizens, moreover, 
may be unhappy about state Second 
and Third Degree nudges in a way 
that they are not about commercial 
influences. 
ANOTHER TOOL IN THE 
BOX?
At first glance, the safest conclusion 
to draw about nudge would seem to 
be that this may not be the complete 
answer to governmental control but 
it is a very useful device to have in 
the regulatory toolbox. The concern 
here, though, is that some tools 
of intervention operate on quite 
different philosophical and ethical 
assumptions. Classical command 
and control rules of regulation, and 
economic incentives, tend to build 
on, and respect, the rationality of 
persons whereas Second and Third 
Degree nudges generally exploit 
the limited cognitive, volitional and 
emotional capacities of individuals. 
Nudge may be here to stay but it 
is essential to distinguish between 
the different degrees of nudge and 
to resist arguing for Second and 
Third Degree nudges as if they are 
of the first degree. It is important, 
moreover,  to  be aware of  the 
device’s practical limitations and to 
avoid the assumption that this is 
just another un-contentious tool of 
governmental control.
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